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The Importance of Objectivity and Falsification in Management Science
Abstract
In general, I thought that the Boal and Willis "Note on the Armstrong/Mitroff Debate" provided an interesting
and fair discussion. The summary of the consequences of the subjective versus objective approaches (Table 1
in their paper) was helpful. It clearly outlined the dilemma faced by scientists: "Should I strive for personal
gain or for scientific contributions?" It also described what is likely to happen to the theories generated from
the subjective and objective approaches. For example, the authors claimed that the subjective approach will
yield a fuller hearing for a theory.
Given my preference for empirical evidence, I was disappointed that Boal and Willis had little evidence to
report. Fortunately, recent research has been done on the above topics. This research supports some of Boal
and Willis's conclusions, but it falsifies their conclusion that the subjective approach will provide a fuller
hearing for theories.
The evidence seems consistent with Boal and Willis's summary of the conflict between the advancement of
scientists and scientific advancement. My summary of the empirical evidence on this conflict led to the
"Author's Formula" (Armstrong, 1982a, p. 197). This states that scientists who are interested in career
advancement should: (a) not select an important problem, (b) not challenge existing beliefs, (c) not obtain
surprising results, (d) not use simple methods, (e) not provide full disclosure, and (f) not write clearly. These
rules for scientists conflict with the aims of science. Unfortunately, many scientists use these rules and profit
from them. Those who break the rules are often dealt with harshly by the scientific community.
Comments
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The Importance of Objectivity and Falsification in Management Science 
 
J. Scott Armstrong 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
In general, I thought that the Boal and Willis “Note on the Armstrong/Mitroff Debate” 1 provided an 
interesting and fair discussion. 2 The summary of the consequences of the subjective versus objective approaches 
(Table 1 in their paper) was helpful. It clearly outlined the dilemma faced by scientists: “Should I strive for personal 
gain or for scientific contributions?” It also described what is likely to happen to the theories generated from the 
subjective and objective approaches. For example, the authors claimed that the subjective approach will yield a 
fuller hearing for a theory. 
 
Given my preference for empirical evidence, I was disappointed that Boal and Willis had little evidence to 
report. Fortunately, recent research has been done on the above topics. This research supports some of Boal and 
Willis’s conclusions, but it falsifies their conclusion that the subjective approach will provide a fuller hearing for 
theories. 
 
The evidence seems consistent with Boal and Willis’s summary of the conflict between the advancement of 
scientists and scientific advancement. My summary of the empirical evidence on this conflict led to the “Author’s 
Formula” (Armstrong, 1982a, p. 197). This states that scientists who are interested in career advancement should: 
(a) not select an important problem, (b) not challenge existing beliefs, (c) not obtain surprising results, (d) not use 
simple methods, (e) not provide full disclosure, and (f) not write clearly. These rules for scientists conflict with the 
aims of science. Unfortunately, many scientists use these rules and profit from them. Those who break the rules are 
often dealt with harshly by the scientific community. 
 
 
Objectivity versus Subjectivity 
 
While many arguments have been presented on the value of subjectivity in science, little evidence exists to 
favor such an approach. My original review of the empirical evidence (Armstrong, 1979) led me to conclude that 
procedures used by many scientists are too subjective. 
 
Cotton (1982) suggests that it is important to distinguish between the conduct of the research work and the 
reporting of this research. He favors objectivity in reporting.3 In my review of the empirical evidence on the 
communication of scientific research (Armstrong, 1982b), I concluded that objectivity was lacking here also. For 
example, acceptance of papers is influenced by the institutional affiliation of the author (Peters & Ceci, 1982). Thus, 
I do not agree with Boal and Willis that the subjective approach will help theories to get a full hearing. My 
conclusion is that some theories will get a full hearing: namely, those theories by well-known scientists that confirm 
popular beliefs. Theories that challenge these beliefs will have more difficulty, especially if by unknown scientists. 
 
Sound research, conducted in an objective manner, often does yield conclusions. In my opinion, evidence 
on which of several approaches is most useful provides the best way to communicate the results. Furthermore, I see 
much benefit in scientists becoming enthusiastic about their conclusions and trying to communicate them to large 
audiences. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is submitted as a reply to that note, which appeared in the Journal of Management, 9 (2).  
2 One exception is that the statement on page 204 suggesting concern for objectivity (reconstructed logic) can be 
justified if it can be shown that only (emphasis added) reconstructed logic is useful in the development of scientific 
theories. I believe this statement to be fallacious. 
3 Cotton favored subjectivity (advocacy) in conducting research, but he presented no evidence on this. 
 2 
The concern over shortcomings in objectivity has led to changes in scientific journals. These include 
formalizing the editorial policies related to objectivity (e.g., calls for papers that test a number of competing and 
reasonable hypotheses), preparing structured reviewing forms, asking authors to nominate a list of potential referees, 
and blind reviewing. These appear to be useful steps. 
 
 
Falsification 
 
Science requires a combination of confirmation and falsification. Boal and Willis provide a good listing of 
reasons why falsification might be misleading, though they might also have included errors and cheating. Still, I 
believe that there is too little emphasis on falsification in management science. 
 
Studies that falsify beliefs are apparently regarded as more useful by scientists. First, falsification studies 
apparently seem more important to their authors: Greenwald (1975) found that about half of those researchers who 
falsified the null hypothesis submitted a report for publication, while only 6% of those who failed to reject the null 
hypothesis attempted to publish. Reviewers also prefer falsification: The bogus paper in the study by Atkinson, 
Furlong, and Wampold (1982) was more likely to be accepted for publication when the rejection of the null 
hypothesis was statistically significant. Finally, other scientists also seem to regard falsification as more important: 
Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1984) found that studies showing human judgment to be faulty were cited six 
times more often than studies showing good performance by judges. Studies confirming current judgmental 
procedures do not call for changes. Those that show current judgmental procedures to be wrong should receive more 
attention, not only for further testing, but also to determine better ways to make judgments. 
 
Unfortunately, falsification is often misused in order to protect existing beliefs. For example, a scientist can 
create the illusion of falsification by using a widely held existing belief as the proposed hypothesis, with a trivial 
alternative as the null hypothesis. The trappings of science, such as mathematics and obscure writing, are then used 
to enhance the proposed hypothesis. The defeat of the null hypothesis is used to support the existing belief. My 
guess is that such a study will mislead scientists by adding to their confidence in this belief. 
 
The scientist must keep in mind that falsification of important beliefs is dangerous work. Mahoney's (1977) 
experimental study shows that other academicians will claim that the quality of the research is poor. (If you don't 
believe experimental studies, it can be learned by experience: Just try to publish such a study.) Manwell (1979) 
reports that he nearly lost his position as a tenured professor by challenging existing dogma. Threats were made to 
Peters and Ceci as a result of their quasi-experimental study suggesting that existing journal review procedures are 
faulty (Sieber, 1983). 
 
Some journals are trying to encourage the publication of papers that falsify existing important beliefs. One 
approach is to reserve space for the publication (without review) of highly controversial studies. Another approach is 
to publish controversial studies along with commentary (Harnad, 1979). Still another approach is to publish the 
referees' reports (with the agreement of the referees) for controversial papers. Finally, publication prospects for 
controversial papers might be improved by asking referees to evaluate the study when the results are withheld. (This 
procedure is used, when requested, by the Journal of Forecasting .) All of these steps seem to be useful in dealing 
with studies falsifying important beliefs. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Arguments on the best way to do research should be subjected to empirical research. Much has already 
been learned from recent research. My conclusion from this research is that those who call for more subjectivity in 
scientific research or reporting are looking at a major shortcoming in scientific practice and are proclaiming it to be 
a virtue. 
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